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Albert Florence is a tall, African American man with dark brown 
skin.  In March 2005, Florence experienced a police encounter that 
would change his life—and that of his wife and children—forever.  
Florence was the finance director for a car dealership in New York, 
married, and the father of three children—William, Shamar, and 
Elijah—with a fourth child on the way.1  A New Jersey State Trooper 
arrested Florence in Burlington County, New Jersey after his pregnant 
wife, April, was stopped for a traffic infraction.2  She was driving 
Florence’s BMW X5 sport utility, with their four year-old son in the 
backseat.3  When Florence identified himself as the owner of the vehicle, 
the officer ran his name through a records search using a computer 
database, New Jersey’s Criminal Justice Information System.4  The 
database reported that Florence was the subject of an outstanding arrest 
warrant in Essex County, New Jersey for failing to pay a fine, a civil 
violation in New Jersey.5 
The officer proceeded to take Florence into custody, despite being 
shown an official document confirming that Florence had indeed paid 
the fine upon which the warrant was based.6  The trooper handcuffed 
and transported Florence to the State Police Barracks, then on to the 
Burlington County Jail, where Florence was strip-searched, contrary to 
New Jersey law and the policy of the jail.7  At the time, New Jersey law 
imposed strict limitations on strip searches of individuals such as 
Florence who had been detained or arrested for non-criminal offenses.8  
The express policy of the Burlington County Jail prohibited strip 
searches of a non-criminal detainee in the absence of a search warrant, 
consent, or reasonable suspicion that he or she possessed contraband.9  
 
 1.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3 Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S.Ct. 1510 
(2012) (No. 10-945), 2011 WL 220710. 
 2.  Id.  
 3.  Id. 
 4.  Florence, 132 S.Ct. at 1515.   
 5.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 1, at 3-4.   
 6.  According to Florence’s original complaint, he produced for the officer a certified letter 
dated October 2004, with a raised seal from the State of New Jersey stating that all judgments 
against Plaintiff were satisfied and that no warrant existed against him.  Complaint at ¶ 20 Florence 
v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 595 F.Supp.2d 492 (N.J. Dist. Ct., 2009) (No. 05CV3619(JHR)), 
2005 WL 2099622.   
 7.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 1, at 3-5.   
 8.  N.J. STAT. ANN. §2A:161A-1 (West 2012).   
 9.  During the various court proceedings, there were a number of terms used to describe the 
searches conducted at the Burlington and Essex County Jails.  A number of officers from the 
Burlington County Jail testified to the fact that non-indictable arrestees are subject to a “visual 
inspection” but not a “strip search,” which was reserved for arrestees being held on indictable 
offenses.  The difference appears to be that the former involved inspecting the naked bodies of 
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In a stall with a partially opened curtain, Florence was ordered to 
remove all of his clothing, open his mouth, lift his tongue, lift his arms, 
turn fully around and turn back around and lift his genitals, all in front of 
an officer who stood an arm’s length away.10 
For Albert Florence, the stakes in being arrested and detained were 
high.  Pending financial transactions at the dealership would be at risk if 
he simply failed to show up for work.  His pregnant wife would have to 
care for their three young children without his assistance.  His children 
would be worried if their father suddenly did not come home.  And his 
oldest child, the four year-old son who witnessed him being handcuffed 
and taken away, would be understandably distraught and anxious about 
his father’s fate.  Florence pleaded with law enforcement officials at the 
State Police Barracks, and again at the Burlington Country Jail, to verify 
the validity of the warrant—a request that was refused.11  At the Police 
Barracks, he was told that the responsibility for clearing up any error 
was that of police in Essex County.12  At the Burlington County Jail, not 
only were no attempts made to determine the validity of the warrant, but 
no bail was set for Florence within twelve hours as required by New 
Jersey law,13 nor was Florence brought before a judicial officer within 
the required seventy-two hour period, despite the ready availability of a 
judge.14  Instead, Florence was held in the Burlington County Jail for 
 
arrestees for tattoos, other body marks, injuries, and vermin as they undressed and showered while 
the latter was “a little more thorough,” according to one officer, because it required inmates to do 
such things as open their mouth, bend over, squat and cough, and lift their genitals.  Florence, 595 
F.Supp.2d at 498-499.  Essex County Jail policy subjected all arrestees, regardless of offense 
category, to a “strip search” resembling that reserved for indictable arrestees at the Burlington 
County Jail.  Id. at 499.  Albert Florence claimed that he was subjected to a “full strip and body 
cavity search” at both facilities.  Id. at 496-97. 
 10.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 1, at 5.  At the time New Jersey law defined a 
“strip search” as “the removal or rearrangement of clothing for the purpose of visual inspection of 
the person’s undergarments, buttocks, anus, genitals or breasts.”  N.J. STAT. ANN. §2A:161A-3 
(West 2012). 
 11.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 1, at 4.   
 12.  Id.   
 13.  N.J.R.Ct. 3:4-1(b) (West 2012) (“If bail was not set when an arrest warrant was issued, 
the person who is arrested on that warrant shall have bail set without unnecessary delay, and no later 
than 12 hours after arrest.”).   
 14.  N.J. R.Ct. 3:4-2(a) (West 2012)  (“Without unnecessary delay, following the filing of a 
complaint the defendant shall be brought before a judge for a first appearance as provided in this 
Rule.  If the defendant remains in custody, the first appearance shall occur within 72 hours after 
arrest, excluding holidays, and shall be before a judge with authority to set bail for the offenses 
charged.”); N.J. R.Ct. 9-5(II)(A) (West 2012) (“Criminal Presiding Judges and Municipal Presiding 
Judges must ensure that all defendants held on bail receive their first appearance within 72 hours 
pursuant to R. 3:4-2 and R. 7:3-1.”).  During the entire time that Florence was held at the Burlington 
County Jail, he was refused access to the phone, refused access to the shower, refused a kit that 
would have contained a tooth brush, towel and soap, and refused permission to talk to a social 
3
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five days before being transferred, on the sixth day, to Essex County, a 
larger, more urban municipality.15 
At the Essex County Correctional Facility, two officers made 
Florence and four other detainees collectively shower and then strip-
searched them together in the presence of each other and other people 
moving through the room.16  They were all ordered to open their mouths, 
lift their genitals, turn around, squat, and cough.17  Unlike the Burlington 
County Jail, the Essex County Correctional Facility practiced “blanket” 
strip searching of all arrestees without regard to the nature of the offense 
for which they were arrested.18  The next day, Florence appeared before 
a judge for the first time.19  The judge ordered that Florence be 
immediately released from custody.20 
Florence subsequently filed a § 1983 action against the state actors 
in Burlington and Essex Counties involved in arresting and strip 
searching him.  In March 2008, Judge Rodriguez of the New Jersey 
Federal District Court granted Florence class certification.21  After a 
civil trial, Judge Rodriguez held that the blanket policy of strip searching 
persons arrested for non-criminal offenses (New Jersey uses the term 
“non-indictable offenses”) in the absence of either consent, a search 
warrant, or reasonable suspicion that the individual is in possession of 
contraband, violated the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.22  
Judge Rodriguez found that in the context of degradation and 
humiliation of the non-criminal arrestee, the privacy rights of the 
individual superseded the interest of jail officials in administrative 
 
worker.  Complaint, supra note 6, at ¶ 25.  When Plaintiff requested any of those services, the 
officers denied him stating that he was a “holdover,” meaning they were waiting to transport 
Plaintiff to Essex County.  Id.   
 15.  Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S.Ct. 1510, 1514 (2012).   
 16.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 1, at 6.   
 17.  Id.   
 18.  See supra, note 9.  This policy was clearly inconsistent with New Jersey law limiting 
strip searches to circumstances in which either the arrestee consents, a search warrant is obtained (in 
other words, upon probable cause), or jail officials have reason to suspect that the arrestee is in 
possession of contraband.  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:161A-1 (West 2012). 
 19.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 1, at 7.   
 20.  Id.   
 21.  The class consisted of: “All arrestees charged with non-indictable offenses who were 
processed, housed or held over at Defendant Burlington County Jail and/or Defendant Essex County 
Correctional Facility from March 3, 2003 to the present date who were directed by Defendants’ 
officers to strip naked before those officers, no matter if the officers term that procedure a ‘visual 
observation’ or otherwise, without the officers first articulating a reasonable belief that those 
arrestees were concealing contraband, drugs or weapons.”  Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 
No. 05-3619, 2008 WL 800970 at *17 (N.J. Dist. Ct., Mar. 20, 2008).  
 22.  Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 595 F.Supp.2d 492, 513 (N.J. Dist. Ct., 2009).   
4
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efficiency, particularly in the absence of any evidence that Burlington 
and Essex Counties were experiencing problems with smuggling of 
contraband.23 
In granting Florence’s summary judgment motion, Judge Rodriguez 
relied upon the four-part balancing test of Bell v. Wolfish,24 a 1979 
Supreme Court case holding that strip searches of pre-trial detainees 
after contact visits in a federal jail could be conducted on less than 
probable cause, but he left unresolved the issue of whether reasonable 
suspicion was a minimal, threshold standard.25 
On appeal, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed Judge 
Rodriguez.  The Court held that a policy of strip-searching all arrestees 
was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment and struck the proper 
balance between a jail’s interest in preventing the smuggling of 
contraband during intake and the detainee’s interest in bodily privacy.26 
This article has five sections.  Part I is a brief history of Search and 
Seizure law, focusing on seismic doctrinal shifts that occurred from the 
1950s to the present.  As a framework for the important cases, the 
Founders’ concerns about abuse of governmental authority are 
discussed, as well as the rights protected by the Fourth Amendment.  
Various governmental programs will also be presented, such as the War 
on Drugs and its call for a large-scale federal anti-drug policy, first 
initiated by President Richard Nixon in 1969.  Part II is a description of 
the central reasoning presented in Florence v. Board of Chosen 
Freeholders,27 including the majority opinion written by Justice 
Kennedy and also the concurring and dissenting opinions.  Part III will 
be a discussion of the four major cases that the Supreme Court relied 
upon in Florence: Bell v. Wolfish,28 Hudson v. Palmer,29 Turner v. 
Safley,30 and Atwater v. Lago Vista.31  Part IV presents four major points 
that emerge from Albert Florence’s predicament and the Florence 
decision.  First, Florence’s arrest and detention was predicated on law 
enforcement’s overreliance on information databases, which in this case 
contained inaccurate information.  Second, strip searches degrade those 
subjected to them and, in the vast majority of cases, are simply 
 
 23.  Id. at 512-13.   
 24.  441 U.S. 520 (1979).   
 25.  Florence, 595 F.Supp.2d at 504.  
 26.  See Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 621 F.3d 296 (3d Cir. 2010).   
 27.  132 S.Ct. 1510 (2011).   
 28.  441 U.S. 520 (1979).   
 29.  468 U.S. 517 (1984).   
 30.  482 U.S. 78 (1987).   
 31.  441 U.S. 520 (2001).   
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unnecessary.  Indeed, the bodily submission, surveillance, and inspection 
entailed in strip searches eerily resembles previous rituals of coercive, 
discriminatory race-making, especially those associated with slave 
markets.  Third, Justice Kennedy’s endorsement of categorical rules and 
“bright line” tests as constitutional guides for law enforcement practice 
puts far too much discretionary power in the hands of law enforcement 
and invites abuse of authority.  Ironically, in recent Fourth Amendment 
decisions involving searches of automobile occupants, the Court has 
criticized and limited the application of bright line rules due to similar 
concerns about abuse of police authority.32  Fourth, the Florence 
decision and categorical strip searches both exemplify policies informed 
by fear, which oscillate between depictions of inflammatory 
dangerousness and super villains, like Timothy McVeigh, and hyper-
vigilant, risk management.  The paper concludes with a discussion of the 
possible repercussions and legacy of Florence on future Fourth 
Amendment litigation involving jails and prisons. 
I. A SHORT HISTORY OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE LAW 
A.  Fourth Amendment Search Doctrine and Its Origins 
Prior to 1967, a search was conceptualized as a physical intrusion 
by a state actor into a constitutionally protected area.33  This formulation 
of a governmental “search” was understood to implicate Fourth 
Amendment rights every time a government agent physically looked for 
evidence hidden from public view in a person’s home, business, or on 
their person.34  It was a highly serviceable definition until modern 
electronic technologies rendered a trespass-based search doctrine 
obsolete.  For example, government agents could significantly intrude 
into private conversations and not trigger Fourth Amendment 
constitutional protections under the “trespass-based” formulation of a 
search.  This tangible notion of privacy left unprotected governmental 
intrusions upon, inter alia, telephonic communications and other 
 
 32.  See Thorton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615 (2004).   
 33.  See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928); Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 
129 (1942).  In 1976, the United States Supreme Court in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 
(1967), held, “Fourth Amendment protects people-and not simply ‘areas’-against unreasonable 
searches and seizures it becomes clear that the reach of that Amendment cannot turn upon the 
presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure.”).  Id. at 353.   
 34.  See Goldman, 316 U.S. at 139-140 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (contesting the majority 
opinion that use of a listening apparatus and dectaphone to listen to the defendant’s conversations, 
without a warrant, was not a violation of the Fourth Amendment due to the lack of physical entry). 
6
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emerging technologies.  In 1967, the Supreme Court reformulated the 
doctrine of searches in the prescient case of Katz v. United States.35 
Since Katz, a search is now understood to be a governmental 
intrusion into a place, thing, or activity in which an individual expects 
privacy, and that society is prepared to accept as reasonable.36  The first 
criterion is subjective: Does the individual have an actual expectation 
that the activity is private?  The second criterion is objective, and judged 
by a normative standard: Is the person’s expectation of privacy 
reasonable?37  Katz completely overhauled the concept of a search 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 
The Fourth Amendment is the primary means by which individuals 
are protected from searches conducted by law enforcement officers and 
other state actors.  Consisting of only fifty-four words, the Fourth 
Amendment contains two clauses.  The first—the Reasonableness 
Clause—protects people from searches that are unreasonable.38  The 
second—the Warrants Clause—describes the requirements for a warrant.  
According to the Fourth Amendment, in order to obtain a warrant to 
conduct a search, police must have a fairly high level of suspicion (i.e., 
probable cause), state the basis of their suspicion, swear to it under oath, 
and itemize who, where, or what they intend to search.39 
The Fourth Amendment was ratified with the intention of 
protecting an “almost sacred right” American Colonists had—to be 
secure in and around their homes, businesses, persons, and other private 
premises.40  In enacting the Reasonableness Clause, the Framers of the 
Bill of Rights emphatically declared that people’s bodies, homes, papers, 
and effects enjoyed security from all unreasonable searches.  On the 
other hand, the Warrants Clause of the Fourth Amendment was crafted 
to specifically outlaw the notorious general warrant by forbidding the 
issuance of any warrant except the type required under English law to 
search private homes.  Under the Warrants Clause, issuance of a special 
warrant would now be predicated upon swearing under oath that the 
warrant was supported by probable cause and not being sought for 
 
 35.  389 U.S. 347.  This understanding of a search emerged from Justice Harlan’s prominent 
concurring opinion.   
 36.  Id. at 361.   
 37.  Id.   
 38.  “The right of the person to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated.”  U.S. CONST. amend. IV.   
 39.  Id.   
 40.  PHILLIP HUBBART, MAKING SENSE OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE LAW: A FOURTH 
AMENDMENT HANDBOOK 77 (2005).   
7
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arbitrary or capricious reasons.41 
General exploratory searches had been abused by British customs 
officers stationed in the American Colonies through the device of 
general warrants (also known as general writs of assistance).42  These 
warrants and writs were used to uncover goods smuggled into the 
Colonies when Great Britain severely restricted colonial trade with 
nations outside the British Empire,43 and to ferret out purveyors of 
publications critical of the King of England.44  These searches provoked 
deep resentment on both sides of the Atlantic.45  General writs of 
assistance authorized customs officials to conduct wide-reaching 
exploratory searches of private homes, unconfined to any particular set 
of circumstances, for a virtually unlimited amount of time.46  Thus, the 
Warrant Clause was crafted to interpose between government agents and 
private persons a neutral, judicial officer, to whom probable cause must 
be demonstrated before a search of a home or a seizure (arrest) takes 
place.47 
Today, the Fourth Amendment’s protections extend to houses, cars, 
offices, phone booths, and just about anywhere that a person can 
subjectively expect to have privacy, as long as it is also a place, thing, or 
activity that society is prepared to recognize as private.48  Today, the 
doctrine of Fourth Amendment searches regulates a vast array of police-
citizen encounters including traffic stops and roadblocks;49 searches of 
homes, offices, automobiles, prison cells,50 and packages;51 body 
searches that are visual, hands on, and invasive;52 manual searches and 
technology-assisted searches;53 bus searches;54 and searches at the 
 
 41.  Id.   
 42.  Anthony C. Thompson, Stopping the Usual Suspects: Race and the Fourth Amendment, 
74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 956, 992-93 (1999).   
 43.  Silas L. Wasserstrom & Louis Michael Seidman, The Fourth Amendment as 
Constitutional Theory, 77 GEO. L. REV. 19, 81-81, 55 n.147 (1988).   
 44.  NELSON BERNARD LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 20-22, 23 (1937).   
 45.  Id. at 42-78.   
 46.  Id. at 53.   
 47.  Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481-82 (1963).   
 48.  Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967).   
 49.  See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979); City of Indianapolis v. Edmund, 531 U.S. 
32 (2000).   
 50.  See Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139 (1962).   
 51.  See Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649 (1980).   
 52.  See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979).   
 53.  See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001); Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 
U.S. 227 (1986); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986).   
 54.  See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991).   
8
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B.  Fourth Amendment Application to Arrestees and Detainees 
The Florence case represents a particular application of the Fourth 
Amendment to arrestees and detainees.  This Fourth Amendment context 
has its own unique history; one that has been shaped by seismic shifts in 
the scope of prisoners’ rights, perceptions of crisis, and notions about the 
appropriateness of categorical rules (in lieu of case-by-case 
determinations). 
As late as 1871, prisoners were regarded as “slaves of the state.”56  
Their rights were limited to that which the state—in its mercy and 
beneficence—chose to grant them.  As felons, they were considered 
“civilly dead,” and therefore excluded from the protections of the Bill of 
Rights. 
The bill of rights is a declaration of general principles to govern a 
society of freemen, and not of convicted felons and men civilly dead.  
Such men have some rights, it is true, such as the law in its benignity 
accords to them, but not the rights of freemen.  They are the slaves of 
the State undergoing punishment for heinous crimes committed against 
the laws of the land.57 
From Reconstruction through and beyond the turn of the 20th 
Century, federal courts refused to constitutionally review the 
mistreatment of prisoners and detainees by state law enforcement and 
corrections officials.58  Congress passed the Ku Klux Klan Act in 
1871,59 and in doing so, created a procedural vehicle by which a person 
deprived of a constitutional right by persons acting “under color of state 
law,” can bring an action against them in federal court.60  Gradually, 
federal courts recognized that prisoners retained the protection of the 
Constitution even after they were convicted.  Nevertheless, the courts 
did not see it as their role to intervene into the operation of state prisons, 
and to protect prisoners’ rights, viewing it instead as a responsibility of 
the executive and legislative branches.  This judicial refusal to engage 
 
 55.  See Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973).   
 56.  Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. 790, *4 (Va. App. Div. 1871).   
 57.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 58.  Jack E. Call, The Supreme Court and Prisoners’ Rights, 59 FED. PROBATION, 36, 36 
(1995).   
 59.  Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) 
(2013)).  The act is also known as the Civil Rights Act of 1871 (and codified at Title 42, Section 
1983).   
 60.  42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West 2013).   
9
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the substantive claims of prisoners was known as the hands-off 
doctrine.61  In 1949, a federal court abstained from addressing prisoner 
complaints absent an allegation of serious bodily injury.62  Anything 
short of this extreme was considered by federal courts to constitute 
impermissible “co-administering” of state prisons.63  Indeed, as late as 
1951, a federal judge refused to intervene in the confinement of 
prisoners in an Alaska jail so overcrowded that forty prisoners occupied 
a mere twenty-seven square feet of space.  Prisoners had to sleep in 
shifts because there was only one bunk for every two prisoners, no 
recreational facilities were provided, and the building was described by 
the judge as an aging “firetrap” lacking an emergency exit, adequate 
ventilation, bathing, and toileting facilities.64 
At this same time—during the hands-off period—ordinary 
individuals not in criminal custody were likewise deprived of Fourth 
Amendment protections due to courts’ reluctance to intervene in the 
affairs of state law enforcement officials.  Not until Wolf v. Colorado65 
considered the constitutionality of Colorado courts, in a criminal trial, 
admitting evidence discovered during the course of an unlawful search, 
was the Fourth Amendment incorporated to the states through the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Even then, when state 
police were found to have unlawfully trespassed and violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the remedy of exclusion was denied to criminal 
defendants until 1961 when the Supreme Court decided Mapp v. Ohio.66 
 
 61.  Note and Comment, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of the Judicial Refusal to 
Review the Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L. J. 506 (1963).   
 62.  Seigel v. Ragen, 88 F. Supp. 996, 999 (N.D. Ill. 1949) (“[E]ven though it is determined 
that the acts of the defendants fall within the scope of the Civil Rights Act, it still remains to be seen 
whether the rights allegedly violated are within the purview of the Federal Constitutional 
protections.  There is very little case authority in regard to the rights of inmates of a 
penitentiary. . . .”).   
 63.  Id.  “This Court is prepared to protect State prisoners from death or serious bodily harm 
in the hands of prison authorities, but is not prepared to establish itself as a ‘co-administrator’ of 
State prisons along with the duly appointed State officials.”   
 64.  Ex Parte Pickens, 101 F. Supp 285 (Ala. Dist. Ct. 1951).  US District Judge Dimond 
made the following comment in his opinion: “Altogether, the place is not fit for human habitation 
and to crowd into this room so many prisoners at once well justifies the comment of representatives 
of the health service of the Federal Government who referred to it as a ‘fabulous obscenity.’”  Id. at 
287.   
 65.  338 U.S. 25 (1949).   
 66.  367 U.S. 643 (1961).  The Mapp Court overturned an Ohio Supreme Court ruling that 
had affirmed the conviction of a Dolly Mapp for possession of illicit pornography.  The police 
found the illicit material by chance after conducting a broad, exploratory search of Mapp’s home for 
bomb-making supplies suspected to be possessed by a boarder in her home.  This evidence was 
never discovered.  Police initially asked Mapp for permission to search her home, but after she 
refused, they returned later brandishing a piece of paper they claimed to be a search warrant, but 
10
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The demise of the hands-off doctrine in both criminal investigations 
and incarceration came about at roughly contemporaneous moments.  As 
judges became more aware of rampant police abuse of criminal suspects, 
much of which was racially motivated at the time, they came to see the 
application of Fourth Amendment standards to state criminal 
investigations as a necessary step to preserve the integrity of the judicial 
process.  In holding that the federal exclusionary rule (excluding 
unlawfully seized evidence from the jury) must apply equally to state 
criminal investigations and trials, the majority in Mapp declared that: 
[w]ere it otherwise, then just as without the [federal exclusionary] rule 
the assurance against unreasonable federal searches and seizures would 
be “a form of words,” valueless and undeserving of mention in a 
perpetual charter of inestimable human liberties, so too, without that 
rule the freedom from state invasions of privacy would be so 
ephemeral and so neatly severed from its conceptual nexus with the 
freedom from all brutish means of coercing evidence as not to merit 
this Court’s high regard as a freedom “implicit in the concept of 
ordered liberty.” 67 
The majority went on to say, “If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, 
it breeds contempt for law, it invites every man to become a law unto 
himself, and it invites anarchy.”68 
As applied to prisoner lawsuits, the hands-off doctrine precluded 
judges from determining what rights survived incarceration.  This 
approach to prisoners’ claims of constitutional violations by prison 
officials was rejected by federal courts in the late 1960s and early 1970s, 
reflecting a historic transformation by the federal judiciary.69  The 
 
which could not be produced subsequently.  The police refused to present the warrant to the woman 
or her attorney.  After the woman successfully snatched it from one of the officers, she was 
handcuffed while the officers searched the home from top to bottom.  The Supreme Court found that 
the police violated the Fourth Amendment in opening a suitcase in Mapp’s basement to discover the 
pornographic material.  The Court declared the evidence inadmissible and overturned the 
conviction.  Thereafter, local police were required to adhere to the constraints of the Fourth 
Amendment in conducting searches.  Id.   
 67.  Id. at 655 (emphasis added).   
 68.  Id. at 659 (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting)).   
 69.  Summarizing the brief, but steep, rise of prisoners’ rights in the United States, veteran 
corrections professional and university professor James E. Robertson explains that between 1967 
and 1977, the federal judiciary abandoned the hands-off doctrine, and constitutionalized most 
aspects of incarceration, including classification of inmates, discipline, medical care, access to the 
courts, religious freedom, exercise, prison rules, treatment of pre-trial detainees, speech, search and 
seizure, food, shelter, clothing, sanitation, and general living conditions.  For an overview of how 
this formed a broader “prisoners’ right movement” that profoundly affected prison routines and 
bureaucracies, see RONARD BERKMAN, OPENING THE GATES: THE RISE OF THE PRISONERS’ 
11
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rejection of hands-off was made explicit in two U.S. Supreme Court 
cases, Wolff v. McDonnell70 and Procunier v. Martinez.71  In Wolff, a 
Due Process case involving a prisoners’ loss of good time credits, Justice 
White “sounded the death knell to the hands-off doctrine”72 in a single 
declaration: “[T]here is no iron curtain drawn between the Constitution 
and the prisons of this country.”73  In Martinez, Justice Powell put all 
doubts about the survival of the hands-off doctrine to rest when he 
proclaimed: “[A] policy of judicial restraint cannot encompass any 
failure to take cognizance of valid constitutional claims whether arising 
in a federal or state institution.  When a prison regulation or practice 
offends a fundamental constitutional guarantee, federal courts will 
discharge their duty to protect constitutional rights.”74 
The demise of the hands-off doctrine cleared the way for federal 
judges to define the parameters of prisoners’ rights.  As we shall see, 
while the courts greatly expanded and recognized prisoners’ and 
detainees’ rights in the 1970s, they soon began to restrict them severely 
in the 1980s to facilitate the War on Drugs.  The case of Albert Florence 
graphically illustrates just how far courts, freed from the jurisdictional 
constraints of hands-off, would roll back the doctrine of Fourth 
Amendment searches, limit substantive protections of incarcerated 
persons, and effectively recreate the effects of the  hands-off doctrine. 
II. THE DECISION IN FLORENCE V. THE BOARD OF CHOSEN FREEHOLDERS 
In a slim five-to-four majority,75 the U.S. Supreme Court held on 
April 2, 2012, that a categorical strip search policy for all arrestees being 
“booked” into jails—irrespective of the seriousness of the charge, the 
suspiciousness of the arrestee, or accuracy of the database upon which 
jail officials rely—comports with the Fourth Amendment protections 
 
MOVEMENT (1979); MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND 
THE MODERN STATE: HOW THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA’S PRISONS (1998); James B. Jacobs, 
Prisoners’ Rights Movement and Its Impacts, 1960-1980, 2 CRIME & JUST. 460 (1980); Christopher 
E. Smith, Black Muslims and the Development of Prisoners’ Rights, J. BLACK STUD. 24 (1993).   
 70.  418 U.S. 539 (1974).   
 71.  416 U.S. 396 (1974).   
 72.  1 MICHAEL B. MUSHLIN, THE RIGHTS OF PRISONERS 9 (4th ed. 2009).  The demise of the 
hands-off doctrine and the beginning of prisoners’ rights law.   
 73.  Wolff, 418 U.S. at 555-56.   
 74.  Procunier, 416 U.S. at 405-06.   
 75.  Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510 (2012).  With Chief Justice 
Roberts and Justice Alito writing brief, but noteworthy, concurring opinions, and Justices Breyer, 
Sotomayor, Ginsburg and Kagan dissenting, Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion represents the 
complete expression of only three justices.   
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enshrined in the U.S. Constitution.76  Justice Kennedy wrote for the 
majority, relying heavily upon several Supreme Court cases that 
dramatically narrowed the scope of prisoners’ rights in the late 1970s 
and 1980s.77  Justice Kennedy framed the question at issue broadly by 
asking what limitations the Constitution imposes on searches of arrestees 
transferred into detention, and whether they can be subjected to a close 
visual body search while naked.78  In prefacing his doctrinal analysis, 
Justice Kennedy emphasizes the Court’s lack of expertise, as well as the 
absence of a record demonstrating that that the categorical strip search 
policy employed by the detention facilities in Burlington and Essex 
Counties was either unnecessary or unjustified.79 
Justice Kennedy starts by introducing Bell v. Wolfish, a 1979 
Supreme Court case that upheld the practice of conducting visual body 
cavity searches (the equivalent of the searches Albert Florence 
underwent) after contact visits in a federal detention facility, holding that 
such searches—conducted on “less than probable cause”—were 
constitutional because they were not “unreasonable” within the meaning 
of the Fourth Amendment.80  The Court in Bell applied a “balancing 
test” that weighed the need for the searches against the gravity of the 
personal rights intruded upon by the search.81  Five justices determined 
that the Constitution condoned conducting visual body cavity searches in 
the federal jail on less than probable cause, while the remaining four 
justices would require a level of suspicion equivalent to that of a search 
warrant.82 
Next, Justice Kennedy introduces two cases, Block v. Rutherford 
and Hudson v. Palmer, to support the position that correctional officials 
can employ categorical rules to maintain institutional security.83  Block 
was a 1984 Supreme Court case in which officials in the Los Angeles 
County Jail banned contact visits due to the threat they posed to security 
in the jail.84  Justice Kennedy uses Block to establish that jail officials 
need not customize procedures designed to enhance security according 
to the risk posed by individual detainees, but may adopt a general ban.85  
 
 76.  Id.   
 77.  Id. at 1513-23.   
 78.  Id. at 1513.   
 79.  Id. at 1513-14.   
 80.  Id. at 1516.  See also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979).   
 81.  Bell, 441 U.S. at 573.   
 82.  See id.   
 83.  Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1516.   
 84.  Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576 (1984).   
 85.  Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1516.   
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Hudson was a 1984 Supreme Court case in which prison officials 
categorically searched inmates’ cells in the absence of individualized 
suspicion of concealing contraband.86  Justice Kennedy draws from each 
of these cases the principle that carceral officials are not required to 
fashion policies that distinguish high risk and low risk offenders when 
protecting institutional security.87 
Justice Kennedy moves on to expand the scope of this principle to 
arrestees, people who are not in jail or prison, but whose liberty is 
nevertheless limited by virtue of criminal suspicion.  He considered the 
case of Atwater v. Lago Vista, a criminal seizure (arrest) case known for 
the principle that that law enforcement officers “in the field” are given 
great latitude in deciding whether or not to arrest a suspect, even when 
the offense committed is only punishable by a fine.88  In that case, the 
reasonableness of Gail Atwater’s arrest under the Fourth Amendment, 
declared Justice Souter, was best determined by an easily administered, 
bright-line rule that did not require law enforcement officers in the field 
to make case-by-case determinations about whether the offense for 
which they are arresting the person would result in jail time, or there was 
a compelling need for detention.89  Atwater established that in striking 
the proper Fourth Amendment balance between the need for the seizure 
and the intrusion upon the individual’s personal rights, the application of 
a categorical “bright line” rule is reasonable and therefore constitutional. 
The issue of Fourth Amendment limits on the lawfulness of 
invasive searches of non-criminal arrestees when they are “booked” into 
a jail is not addressed by Atwater.  Nevertheless, with the categorical 
approach of Atwater (with regard to an officer’s decision, in the field, to 
arrest or not) firmly established, Justice Kennedy goes on in Florence to 
consider the decision of correctional officials whether or not to conduct 
an invasive bodily search upon an arrestee being admitted into a jail 
absent evidence that he or she may be in possession of contraband. 
Justice Kennedy frames the question in the case as follows: can 
security imperatives in a jail override the assertion that some detainees 
must be exempt from invasive search procedures absent reasonable 
suspicion that a detainee is harboring contraband?90  He adds weight to 
the security side of the equation and sets the bar high for detainees by 
reminding us that the Court must defer to jail officials unless there is 
 
 86.  Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984).   
 87.  Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1516.   
 88.  532 U.S. 318 (2001).   
 89.  Id.   
 90.  Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1518.   
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“substantial evidence” their response to the situation is “exaggerated.”91 
With the question so framed, Justice Kennedy describes and cites a 
host of medical, statistical, correctional, and other sources cited in the 
fourteen amicus briefs in support of the respondents (Burlington and 
Essex Counties) to establish the weight of the state’s interest in 
preventing contraband from coming into jails, the appropriateness of 
deferring to the judgments of jail officials with regard to how best to do 
accomplish this goal, and to demonstrate that the practice of conducting 
strip searches on arrestees being admitted into Burlington and Essex 
County Jails without regard to the nature of the offense prompting the 
arrest is rational and not an “exaggerated” response to security 
concerns.92 
Next, Justice Kennedy elaborates upon a whole host of external 
threats to safety and security that plague contemporary jails and 
detention centers.  Kennedy recites a litany of risks that the admission of 
new inmates poses to jail staff, existing detainees, and the new detainee.  
These risks include everything from the menacing to the mundane: the 
introduction of lice and contagious infections; contraband weapons and 
drugs; wounds or other injuries requiring immediate medical attention; 
admission of gang members and the propensity for violence rival gang 
affiliations cause; and everyday items such as lighters, matches, cell 
phones, and common medications, as well as chewing gum, hairpins, 
and wigs.93  According to Kennedy, the introduction of any unauthorized 
item that is scarce in jails puts an entire jail at risk because it will be 
prized in the underground economy and spark predation and violence.94  
Writes Kennedy: “Correctional officials inform us ‘[t]he competition . . . 
for such goods begets violence, extortion, and disorder.’”95 
The heightened risk that these objects, menacing or mundane, 
might be introduced into a jail by an arrestee acting willfully, or coerced 
by others, justifies, in Kennedy’s mind, intrusive searches of detainees 
without regard to the nature or seriousness of the offense charged.  
 
 91.  Id. at 1518 (citing Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 584-585 (1984)).   
 92.  Id. 1518-23.  The Court in Turner v. Salfey identified four factors to consider to 
determine the reasonableness of the regulation at issue: (1) Whether there is a valid, rational 
connection between the regulation and governmental interest part forward to justify it; (2) Whether 
there are alternative means to exercising the right that remain open to prison inmates; (3) What 
impact with the accommodation of the asserted right have on other inmates, and the allocation of 
prison resources generally; (4) Whether there is an absence of other alternatives, which is evidence 
that the regulation is reasonable.  Turner v. Salfey, 482 U.S. 78, 89-91 (1987).   
 93.  Id. at 1518-19.   
 94.  Id. at 1519.   
 95.  Id.   
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Justice Kennedy cites examples of police intercepting notorious 
criminals in traffic stops as evidence that individuals detained by law 
enforcement officers for minor offenses can be “the most devious and 
dangerous criminals.”96 
Timothy McVeigh was stopped by a state trooper who noticed he was 
driving without a license plate.  Police stopped serial killer Joel Rifkin 
for the same reason.  One of the terrorists involved in the September 
11 attacks was stopped and ticketed for speeding just two days before 
hijacking Flight 93.  Reasonable correctional officials could conclude 
these uncertainties mean they must conduct the same thorough search 
of everyone who will be admitted to their facilities.97 
The separate concurring opinions written by Justices Roberts and Alito 
and the dissenting opinion of Justice Breyer, joined by Justices 
Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, demonstrate the polarization of the 
justices’ interpretations of the Fourth Amendment’s proscription of 
unreasonable searches in the context of intrusive and humiliating strip 
searches of arrestees.  The two concurring justices, Roberts and Alito, 
are most discomfited by the application of a categorical rule.  Justice 
Roberts’ concurrence carves out an exception to the categorical rule 
adopted by the majority when the facts are friendlier to the arrestee.98  In 
other words, if Florence were arrested for a minor traffic offense (not an 
outstanding arrest warrant) or if Florence was detained away from the 
general population of the jail (instead of being “booked” into the general 
population), Roberts would oppose the application of a categorical rule.  
He admonishes the court to “leave open the possibility of exceptions, to 
ensure that we ‘not embarrass the future.’”99 
Justice Alito similarly concurs with a caveat that demonstrates his 
discomfort with a categorical rule.  He understands the lead opinion to 
reserve judgment on the blanket reasonableness of a full strip search of 
an arrestee when his detention has not been reviewed by a judicial 
officer and he can be detained apart from the general population.100  
Justice Alito is concerned that persons arrested for minor offenses will 
be traumatized by full strip searches.  Most persons arrested for minor 
offenses are not dangerous and will be released as soon as they appear 
before a magistrate, many will have the charges dropped, and only a few 
 
 96.  Id. at 1520.   
 97.  Id. (citations omitted). 
 98.  Id. at 1523 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).   
 99.  Id. (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (quoting Justice Frankfurter in Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. 
Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 300 (1944)).   
 100.  Id. at 1524 (Alito, J., concurring).   
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will be sentenced to incarceration.101  “For these persons,” Alito 
contends, “admission to the general jail population, with the concomitant 
humiliation of a strip search, may not be reasonable . . . .”102 
Finally, dissenting Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Ginsburg, 
Sotomayor, and Kagan, takes the position of the majority of the Circuit 
Courts of Appeal, that the invasion of privacy occasioned by strip-
searching arrestees for minor offenses is not reasonable in the absence of 
reasonable suspicion.103  He begins by identifying the applicable 
standard as the Bell v. Wolfish “balancing test,” a test of reasonableness 
that, in the words of the Bell Court, “is not capable of precise definition 
or mechanical application.”104  The Bell “balancing test” considers the 
scope of the intrusion into the personal privacy of the person being 
searched, and “balances” it against the stated justification for the 
intrusion, taking into account the manner and place in which the search 
is conducted.105 
After setting forth the applicable test, Justice Breyer goes on to 
consider the nature of the intrusion entailed by strip searches.  He 
characterizes such searches as “serious invasion[s] of privacy” that are 
inherently “harmful, humiliating, and degrading,” 106 even when they are 
carried out by guards in a respectful, touchless manner.  In contrast to 
the litany of dangers Justice Kennedy recounts while drawing on the 
briefs of amici curiae for the respondent county jails, Justice Breyer 
describes the variety of arrestees subjected to visual strip searches 
named in the briefs of amici curiae for the petitioner, Florence.  They 
include a nun arrested for trespassing in an anti-war demonstration, 
women strip-searched while menstruating, victims of sexual violence, 
and others detained for infractions as minor as driving with a noisy 
muffler, failing to use a turn signal, and riding a bicycle without an 
audible bell.107 
After describing the intrusion on the arrestee’s privacy, Justice 
Breyer considers the justifications given by prison officials for strip 
 
 101.  Id.   
 102.  Id.   
 103.  “In my view, such a search of an individual arrested for a minor offense that does not 
involve drugs or violence—say a traffic offense, a regulatory offense, an essentially civil matter, or 
any other such misdemeanor—is an ‘unreasonable searc[h]’ forbidden by the Fourth Amendment, 
unless prison authorities have reasonable suspicion to believe that the individual possesses drugs or 
other contraband.”  Id. at 1525 (Breyer, J., dissenting).   
 104.  Id. at 1526.   
 105.  Id. (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979)).   
 106.  Id.   
 107.  Id. at 1527.   
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searches—detecting diseases that may spread within close confinement, 
identifying gang members to avoid violence, and intercepting 
contraband—and finds “no convincing reason why, absent reasonable 
suspicion, involuntary strip searches of those arrested for minor offenses 
are necessary in order to further the penal interests” proffered.108 
In striking the balance in favor of requiring jail authorities to justify 
the necessity of these strip searches, Breyer emphasizes the lack of 
empirical evidence that visual strip searches—particularly the most 
degrading elements, i.e. lifting genitals for visual inspection and “squat 
and cough” for anal inspection—have any rational connection to health 
or gang affiliations, disease, or contraband.109  And with regard to 
detecting contraband, Breyer cites empirical studies demonstrating that 
strip searches are generally unreliable in revealing contraband, and 
generally less effective than pat frisks.110  Adding the weight of the “best 
practices” of standard-bearing organizations such as the American 
Correctional Association (that promulgated a standard forbidding 
suspicionless strip searches) and the Justice Department’s National 
Institute of Corrections (whose standard desk reference for sound 
correctional practices advises against suspicionless strip-searches), 
Breyer sides with the seven Courts of Appeal that have considered the 
issue and interpreted the Fourth Amendment as requiring jail officials to 
have reasonable suspicion that an arrestee is concealing weapons or 
contraband before strip searching him or her.111 
The announcement of the Florence decision immediately elicited 
polarized responses from law enforcement, urban communities of color, 
and civil rights-civil liberties advocates.  The Times of Trenton called the 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Constitution “outrageous,” and 
characterized the opinion as a “disgrace.”112  Reporting for the 
Washington Post, Richard Cohen criticized the Supreme Court for going 
 
 108.  Id. at 1528.   
 109.  “[T]here is no connection between the genital lift and the ‘squat and cough’ that Florence 
was allegedly subjected to and health or gang concerns,” urged Breyer, citing the Brief for 
Academics on Gang Behavior as Amici Curiae and the Brief for Medical Society of New Jersey et 
al. as Amici Curiae.  Id. at 1528. 
 110.  Id. at 1528-29.   
 111.  Id. at 1529-30.  Roberts v. Rhode Island, 239 F.3d 107, 112-13 (1st Cir. 2001); Weber v. 
Dell, 804 F.2d 796, 802 (2d Cir. 1986); Logan v. Shealy, 660 F.2d 1007, 1013 (4th Cir. 1981); 
Stewart v. Lubbock Cty., Tex., 767 F.2d 153, 156-57 (5th Cir. 1985); Masters v. Crouch, 872 F.2d 
1248, 1255 (6th Cir. 1989); Mary Beth G. v. City of Chicago, 723 F.2d 1263, 1273 (7th Cir. 1983); 
Jones v. Edwards, 770 F.2d 739 (8th Cir. 1985); Hill v. Bogans, 735 F.2d 391, 394 (10th Cir. 1984). 
 112.   Editorial: U.S. Supreme Court strip-search ruling is a disgrace, THE TIMES OF TRENTON 
(Apr. 10, 2012, 7:09 AM), http://www.nj.com/times-
opinion/index.ssf/2012/04/editorial_us_supreme_court_str.html.   
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“so far over the line of common sense that the majority looks both 
foolish and vindictive” in offering a ruling Cohen describes as 
“inane.”113  In response to the decision, the ACLU of New Mexico sent 
letters to county jails throughout the state interpreting the state 
constitution as requiring reasonable suspicion before an arrestee being 
admitting into a jail can be searched and urging the jails to disregard the 
Court’s ruling in Florence.114  In sharp contrast to uniformly scathing 
responses by the press and civil liberties advocates, Law Enforcement 
Today’s corrections expert Peter Curcio hailed the Florence decision as a 
“major win for correctional staff nationwide”115 because jails across the 
country could now pursue blanket strip searches of all detainees without 
fear of costly litigation due to vague or ill-defined legal standards. 
III. THE IMPORTANT CASES IN FLORENCE 
It is important to look closely at Justice Kennedy’s use of several of 
the key cases in his opinion to discern the Court’s rationale and 
appreciate the legal maneuvers Justice Kennedy makes in arguing 
against the weight of both judicial precedent and correctional best 
practices.  Kennedy cites four cases in particular, selectively drawing 
from them to craft a bright line rule supporting the use of categorical 
strip searches.  The cases are: Bell v. Wolfish (1979), Hudson v. Palmer 
(1984), Turner v. Safley (1987), and Atwater v. Lago Vista (2001). 
A.  Bell v. Wolfish 
Since the late 1970s, the Court decided several Fourth Amendment 
cases concerning prisons that featured prominently in the Florence 
decision.  In Bell v. Wolfish, the Court addressed the issue of strip 
searches in a correctional setting.116  The case considered a host of 
complaints about the conditions in the Metropolitan Correctional Center 
(“MCC”), a federal jail in New York City designed primarily to house 
pretrial detainees.117  The MCC opened in 1975, but as was typical after 
states enacted harsh, sweeping sentencing reforms (in this case, 
 
 113.   Richard Cohen, In strip-search case, the Supreme Court shows a lack of common sense, 
WASH. POST, Apr. 3, 2011..   
 114.  Micah McCoy, ACLU Warns NM Jails Against Routine Strip Searches, ACLU OF NM 
(May 8, 2012), http://www.aclu-nm.org/aclu-warns-nm-jails-against-routine-strip-
searches/2012/05/.   
 115.  Peter Curcio, Major Win for Corrections, LAW ENFORCEMENT TODAY (May 12, 2012), 
http://lawenforcementtoday.com/2012/05/12/major-win-for-corrections/.   
 116.  441 U.S. 520 (1979).   
 117.  Id. at 523.   
19
Miller: Bright Lines, Black Bodies
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2013
ARTICLE 4 - MILLER (DO NOT DELETE) 4/8/2013  10:13 AM 
452 AKRON LAW REVIEW [46:433 
mandatory minimum sentences under the Rockefeller Drug Laws, 
enacted in 1973),118 the facility was outdated and insufficient in short 
order.  While the building was under construction, the number of 
persons going into pre-trial detention skyrocketed, and the design 
capacity of the facility was exceeded shortly after it opened.119  In 
response, the Bureau of Prisons began double-bunking the population, 
accommodating detainees on cots in common areas, and initiated 
draconian security measures to cope with the security concerns that 
attend overcrowding, including subjecting detainees to body-cavity 
searches after contact visitation.120  After considering “a veritable 
potpourri of complaints that implicated virtually every facet of the 
institution’s conditions and practices,”121 the Court upheld the practice 
of conducting visual body cavity searches (the equivalent of the searches 
Albert Florence underwent) after contact visits, holding that such 
searches—conducted on “less than probable cause”—were constitutional 
because they were not “unreasonable” within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment.122  In determining whether the practice was reasonable, the 
Court balanced the jail’s need for the search against the invasion of 
personal rights attending it.123  On the jail’s side of the balance sheet, 
Justice Rehnquist cited unique security dangers such as the smuggling of 
money, drugs, weapons, and other contraband, and on the detainee’s 
side, the interests involved were personal privacy and protection from 
abusive searches.124 
Ultimately, on the visual body cavity search issue, five justices 
determined that the Constitution condoned conducting them on less than 
probable cause,125 while the remaining four justices required a level of 
suspicion equivalent to that of a search warrant.126  The Bell Court’s 
precise language demonstrates the narrowness of the holding: 
The [visual body cavity] searches must be conducted in a reasonable 
manner.  But we deal here with the question whether visual body-
cavity inspections as contemplated by the MCC rules can ever be 
 
 118.  The Rockefeller Drug Laws require judges to give mandatory minimum sentences based 
on the type or amount of the drug sold or possessed.  See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 220 (McKinney 2012).   
 119.  Bell, 441 U.S. at 524.   
 120.  Id. at 525-26, 530.   
 121.  Id. at 527.   
 122.  Id. at 557.   
 123.  Id. at 569-70.   
 124.  Id. at 556-57.   
 125.  Id. 520-63.   
 126.  Id. at 563 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Id. at 563-579 (Marshall, 
J., dissenting); Id. at 579-99 (Stevens, J. & Brennan, J., dissenting).   
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conducted on less than probable cause.  Balancing the significant and 
legitimate security interests of the institution against the privacy 
interests of the inmates, we conclude that they can.127 
There are several problems with Justice Kennedy’s reliance upon 
the Bell precedent, both doctrinal and factual.  First, Bell concerned 
prisoners held under a court order in a federal detention center.128  It did 
not concern the average citizen just taken off the streets prior to being 
seen by a judge, as was the case for Albert Florence.  Bell held only that 
the type of search Albert Florence underwent could be conducted 
constitutionally on less than probable cause.  Bell held that a visual body 
cavity inspection on this basis was “reasonable,” and therefore did not 
violate the Reasonableness Clause of the Fourth Amendment.129  
Significantly, Bell did not consider a categorical policy of strip-
searching in the absence of any level of suspicion on the part of 
correctional staff.  Second, Bell only addressed the use of close visual 
inspection of naked detainees after contact visitation with visitors.130  
Such visits are commonly known by prison officials to be one of the 
most likely vectors of contraband into prisons and jails.  
Notwithstanding the degrading nature of such searches by prison guards 
under any circumstances, the detainees in Bell could avoid the violation 
of their bodily privacy either by refusing visits altogether or electing to 
have non-contact visits.  Arrestees being admitted to the Burlington and 
Essex County detention facilities could not “opt out” of being strip-
searched.  Third, the strip searches the Supreme Court considered in Bell 
were conducted under policies explicitly authorized by the Bureau of 
Prisons, the supervising agency.131  In contrast, the officials who strip-
searched Albert Florence did so in violation of New Jersey State Law 
and the procedural rules of the two jails.  Fourth, the Bell decision 
occurred at a time of profound crisis in jails and prisons, when these 
institutions were inundated with new commitments that severely taxed 
resources.  Search policies like the one addressed in Bell were a direct 
product of this moment rather than a timeless standard of jail 
management. 
Bell established that a reasonable search within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment strikes a balance between the government’s need for 
 
 127.  Id. at 560 (majority opinion) (citation omitted). 
 128.  Id. at 520.   
 129.  Id. at 559-60.   
 130.  Id. at 528.   
 131.  Id. at 525-26, 558.   
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the search and the individual’s right of privacy.132  To strike a “balance” 
in favor of a categorical rule all but eviscerates the weight of the 
interests on one side of the scale.  Justice Kennedy justifies a “balance” 
in favor of a categorical rule by stressing the importance of eliminating 
all exceptions to the rule.  He cites a well-known criminal procedure 
case, Atwater v. Lago Vista (described below), that affords great latitude 
to law enforcement officers “in the field” to arrest a suspect on a non-
jailable offense. 
B.  Hudson v. Palmer 
Five years after the Bell v. Wolfish decision, the Court moved more 
clearly in the direction of establishing categorical rules concerning the 
application of the Fourth Amendment to prison settings.  In Hudson v. 
Palmer, the Court addressed the issue of whether correctional officials 
could lawfully conduct a random, suspicionless “shakedown” search of 
an inmate’s cell without violating the Fourth Amendment.133  A divided 
(five-to-four) Court found that a prison cell bears none of the 
characteristics of a home and that inmates had “no legitimate expectation 
of privacy in their individual cells.”134  As such, the Fourth 
Amendment’s protection of the individual against “unreasonable” 
governmental searches does not apply to a prison cell.135  The Hudson 
Court “balanced” the interests of the government against those of the 
individual prisoner and found that a categorical rule struck the proper 
balance.136  When addressing the potential for abuse that a blanket 
suspicionless search policy may invite, the Hudson Court briefly 
acknowledged the danger of such searches being used to harass 
prisoners,137 and in the next breath extolled their effectiveness on the 
same basis—correctional officers may conduct them at will, and without 
 
 132.  The test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise 
definition or mechanical application.  In each case it requires a balancing of the need for the 
particular search against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails.  Courts must consider 
the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for 
initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted.  Id. at 559.   
 133.  468 U.S. 517 (1984).   
 134.  Id. at 523.   
 135.  “[W]e hold that society is not prepared to recognize as legitimate any subjective 
expectation of privacy that a prisoner might have in his prison cell and that, accordingly, the Fourth 
Amendment proscription against unreasonable searches does not apply within the confines of the 
prison cell.”  Id. at 525-26.   
 136.  Id. at 527.   
 137.  “Of course, there is a risk of maliciously motivated searches, and of course, intentional 
harassment of even the most hardened criminals cannot be tolerated by a civilized society.”  Id. at 
528.   
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justification: “The uncertainty that attends random searches of cells 
renders these searches perhaps the most effective weapon of the prison 
administrator in the constant fight against the proliferation of knives and 
guns, illicit drugs, and other contraband.”138  In other words, the Court 
argued that the expectation of random searches provided an additional 
deterrent to contraband trafficking.  While the ruling notably did not 
extend to bodily searches, it nevertheless established that “the prisoner’s 
expectation of privacy always yield[s] to what must be considered the 
paramount interest in institutional security.”139 
While adopting Hudson’s categorical approach to prisoners’ cell 
shakedowns, Justice Kennedy ignores the fact that Hudson failed to 
apply a categorical approach to searches of prisoners’ bodies.  Again, 
Kennedy is using case law that addressed a much different situation.  
Hudson considered convicted felons serving sentences in a maximum-
security state prison, but Kennedy cites it as a precedent for a county jail 
and an unconvicted citizen arrested on an invalid bench warrant.  The 
Hudson Court reached only the constitutionality of the cell search at 
issue and the attending destruction of a prisoner’s personal effects that 
occurred.  It left unaddressed the question of a prisoners’ bodily privacy. 
C.  Turner v. Safley 
A 1987 decision, Turner v. Safley, profoundly altered the trajectory 
of prisoners’ rights by granting greater deference to prison officials 
when prison policies or practices impinge on prisoners’ constitutional 
rights.140  In deciding a rather narrow question concerning whether 
inmates in Missouri prisons could exchange letters with each other and 
whether they could marry without the approval of prison authorities, the 
Court crafted a four-factor test to ascertain the reasonableness of prison 
regulations.  This four-factor test has subsequently influenced numerous 
court decisions at the federal and state level concerning the 
constitutionality of prison regulations and policies.  The first factor 
requires prison officials to specify “a valid, rational connection” between 
the restrictions in question and penological objectives, such as security 
 
 138.  Id.   
 139.  Id. at 528.   
 140.  482 U.S. 78 (1987).  For an critical assessments of the impact of the Turner decision, see 
MUSHLIN, supra note 72; James E. Robertson, The Rehnquist Court and the “Turnerization” of 
Prisoners’ Rights, 10 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 97 (2006); Trevor N. McFadden, Note, When to Turn to 
Turner?: The Supreme Court’s Schizophrenic Prison Jurisprudence, 22 J. L. & POL. 135 (2006); 
Cheryl Dunn Giles, Turner v. Safley and Its Progeny: A Gradual Retreat to the “Hands-Off” 
Doctrine, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 219 (1993).   
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or rehabilitation.141  The second seeks to ascertain if there are alternative 
means that an inmate could exercise the specific right.142  The third 
factor considers how the exercise of the right would affect prison staff, 
other inmates, and other aspects of prison operations.143  The final factor 
asks whether prison officials have alternative means of achieving their 
objectives.144 
While the Turner Court laid out these factors in detail, they failed 
to provide guidance on how to weigh each factor or how to resolve 
situations where the answers to each factor contradict one another.145  As 
Michael Mushlin has observed, in applying the Turner standard, “the 
Court eschews a strict scrutiny analysis, which is normally called for 
when the state impinges on fundamental constitutional rights of citizens, 
when the rights of prisoners are involved.”146  Rather, the four-factor 
reasonability test limits the normal standard because, as the Turner 
opinion states: 
Subjecting the day-to-day judgments of prison officials to an inflexible 
strict scrutiny analysis would seriously hamper their ability to 
anticipate security problems and to adopt innovative solutions to the 
intractable problems of prison administration.  The rule would also 
distort the decision-making process, for every administrative judgment 
would be subject to the possibility that some court somewhere would 
conclude that it had a less restrictive way of solving the problem at 
hand.  Courts inevitably would become the primary arbiters of what 
constitutes the best solution to every administrative problem.147 
Turner contemplates a kind of deference that prioritizes the 
judgments and expertise of corrections officials.  It is ironic, then, that in 
Albert Florence’s case the expertise and judgment jail officials might 
have used was subordinated to information contained in a database.  
Turner has been widely criticized as a return to the hands-off doctrine.148 
D.  Atwater v. Lago Vista 
Justice Kennedy also based his willingness to defer to prison 
authorities in their treatment of Albert Florence on a well-known 
 
 141.  Turner, 482 U.S. at 89.   
 142.  Id. at 90.   
 143.  Id.   
 144.  Id.   
 145.  MUSHLIN, supra note 72, at 46.   
 146.  Id.   
 147.  Turner, 482 U.S. at 89.   
 148.  See supra, note 140.   
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criminal procedure case, Atwater v. Lago Vista.  Atwater stands for the 
proposition that law enforcement officers “in the field” are afforded 
great latitude to arrest a suspect on a non-jailable offense (e.g., a mere 
civil violation, or a fine-only criminal offense).149  The question in the 
case was whether the Fourth Amendment restricts police officers from 
conducting a warrantless arrest for a minor criminal offense that is 
punishable by a fine only.150  Atwater concerned a driver who was 
arrested for a non-jailable, misdemeanor seatbelt violation, and who 
contested her arrest as an unlawful seizure under the Fourth 
Amendment.  The reasonableness of Atwater’s arrest under the Fourth 
Amendment, declared Justice Souter writing for the five justices in the 
majority, was best determined by an easily administered, “bright line” 
rule (rather than a balancing test) that did not require law enforcement 
officers in the field to make case-by-case determinations about whether 
the offense for which they are arresting the person would result in jail 
time, or whether there was a compelling need for detention.151 
There are several points to be gleaned from Kennedy’s use of these 
particular cases as precedents.  First, there is little discussion of harm 
done to Albert Florence in the case at hand, although there is plenty of 
discussion of citizen, detainee, and prisoner rights in the cases cited.  
Second, while these cases refer to the standards employed by the various 
agencies involved, Kennedy ignores the American Correctional 
Association “best practices,” the National Institute of Corrections desk 
reference standards, and the discussion of standards in cases by the 
seven Federal Circuit Courts of Appeal that decided this issue 
differently.  Deference to administrators and corrections professionals, 
the keystone of Turner, is decisive only as long as Kennedy agrees with 
their conclusions.  Otherwise, their expertise is disregarded.  Third, 
Kennedy has chosen cases that lean toward greater deference to 
correctional authorities and law enforcement officers, reinforcing the 
trend of the last few decades of the War on Drugs to allow correctional 
officials, not courts, to set standards for the what is reasonable in the 
prison and jail setting, and heading back toward the hands-off era.  
Finally, the Court has specifically chosen to use doctrine and specific 
cases that do not match the situation of Florence.  Florence involves the 
arrest of a citizen taken to jail on what later turns out to be an invalid 
bench warrant.  In this case, the Court allows full-blown convicted felon, 
 
 149.  532 U.S. 318 (2001).   
 150.  Id. at 323.   
 151.  Id. at 345.   
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maximum security thinking to apply.  None of the cases really address 
Florence’s situation.  Bell dealt with a federal detention center with 
inmates held over by the court.  Both Hudson and Turner took place in a 
state prison with convicted felon.  The situation in Atwater involved an 
arrestee and car search. 
IV. ANALYSIS 
Florence is a case marked by unsatisfactory solutions.  Justice 
Kennedy’s response to a multi-faceted situation with many significant 
interests involved is to impose a categorical rule that defers to the 
judgments of jail officials and prioritizes their interests.  This way of 
reading the situation fails to consider other valid frames.  This decision 
has several problematic aspects to it, four of which will be discussed in 
this section—the Information Age, race, “bright lines,” and fear-
mongering. 
First, the Florence decision fails to see Albert Florence’s wrongful 
arrest and detention (as well as the attending strip search and denial of 
Due Process) as a problem of the Information Age for law enforcement 
and society.  The facts of the Florence case demonstrate that 
inaccuracies in criminal databases can result in harsh consequences.  
Although apparently lost upon Justice Kennedy in his eagerness to defer 
to the expertise of law enforcement and jail officials in the Florence 
case, these officials cede their expertise to a computer.  In doing so, they 
cease to exercise the unique expertise, experience and judgment that 
forms the underlying rationale for letting these officials, rather than 
judges, determine the parameters of what is reasonable. 
A.  Problem of the Information Age 
“Misinformation has a way of fouling up people’s lives, especially 
when the party with the inaccurate information has an advantage in 
power and authority.” 
— Richard O. Mason, “Four Ethical Issues of the Information 
Age”152 
The avoidable humiliation to which Albert Florence was subjected 
underscores a growing problem of the Information Age—overreliance 
upon computer databases for accurate information about a person’s 
criminal status.  The event that triggered Florence’s arrest was a “hit” on 
 
 152.  Richard O. Mason, Four Ethical Issues of the Information Age, MGMT. INFO. SYS. Q., 
Mar. 1986, at 5, 7, available at http://www.gdrc.org/info-design/4-ethics.html.   
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a statewide computer database that inaccurately reflected an outstanding 
bench warrant.  Had the information in the database been accurate, Mrs. 
Florence might have received a citation for speeding, but Albert 
Florence would never have been arrested, booked into the Burlington 
County Jail, and made to stand naked in front of a jail official while 
being inspected at close range.  But for that county’s failure to bring 
Florence before a magistrate within the prescribed seventy-two hours, 
Florence might not have undergone a second strip search upon his 
transfer to the Essex County Correctional Facility. 
As information has become more accessible on the Internet and 
across information systems, law enforcement officers have moved from 
investigating a suspect’s background on the scene through radio contact 
with a dispatcher (at most), to accessing information about suspects 
through a whole range of new technology options, including pulling up 
information about suspects using on-board computers in their patrol cars.  
The latter takes one-third of the time.153  The premise behind having 
computer databases accessible from a squad car is that law enforcement 
officers can take precautions to protect themselves and the public based 
upon the information they have access to on-site and investigate crime 
more efficiently because the technology makes them more aware of 
crimes that may be afoot.  However, this enhanced efficiency and greater 
security is predicated upon the accuracy of the information being 
conveyed to police officers. 
Police are accessing information from a multitude of sources, 
relying on databases to provide an accurate assessment of the risk that a 
particular individual encountered on the road or on the street is 
dangerous.  Currently, police receive information from more databases 
than ever.  For example, law enforcement officers now standardly use a 
broad range of technologies in street encounters with the public as well 
as in police investigations, including the National Crime Information 
Center (“NCIC”) computerized database,154 Automatic License Plate 
 
 153.  Crime Fighting Computers, TECH CONNECTION ONLINE: TECH. FOUND., 
http://www.glencoe.com/sec/computered/techconnect/student/pdfs/TechFoundations_11.pdf (last 
visited Dec. 28, 2012).   
 154.  The National Crime Information Center maintains a massive database of information 
about crimes and criminal offenders.  In 2009, NCIC contained more than 15 million active records.  
Local, state and federal criminal justice agencies enter records in the NCIC and those records are 
categorized and shared nationwide.  The NCIC database consists of nineteen files: seven property 
files containing records of stolen articles, boats, guns, license plates, parts, securities, and vehicles; 
and twelve persons files containing the Supervised Release; National Sex Offender Registry; 
Foreign Fugitive; Immigration Violator; Missing Person; Protection Order; Unidentified Person; 
U.S. Secret Service Protective; Gang; Known or Appropriately Suspected Terrorist; Wanted Person; 
and Identity Theft Files.  The system also contains images that can be associated with NCIC records 
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Recognition Technology,155 Law Enforcement Automated Data 
Services,156 and the CLEAR database.157 
Law enforcement field officers receive information from the NCIC 
that is both criminal and civil in nature.  Since August 2003, the NCIC 
database has reported civil immigration violations.158  These violations 
result from actions like overstaying a visa or failing to leave the United 
States after being ordered removed.  Under the Secure Communities 
federal immigration enforcement program, local law enforcement 
officials booking any individual into a jail are required to conduct a 
fingerprint check of all immigration databases in order to identify all 
non-U.S. citizens and all civil immigration offenders and report their 
presence in the jail to ICE.159 
As police get more information from computer databases, the risk 
of error becomes more significant.  The FBI cautions local law 
enforcement officials not to rely on the data contained in the NCIC alone 
as a basis for action (e.g. arrest or detention), but to make contact with 
the entering agency to verify the information is accurate and up-to-
date.160  Once the record is confirmed, the inquiring agency may take 
action to arrest a fugitive, return a missing person, charge a subject with 
 
to help agencies identify people and property items.  The Interstate Identification Index, which 
contains automated criminal history record information, is accessible through the same network as 
NCIC.  National Crime Information Center, FBI, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ncic (last visited 
Dec. 28, 2012).  On a single day in 2009, NCIC processed more than 7.9 million transactions.  Id.   
 155.  ALPRT is an integrated camera-database technology captures images of license plates 
while the squad car is moving or stationary, and processes the numbers and letters using optical 
character recognition software, comparing them against a known database.  Suspected “hits” are 
relayed to police officers either visually or verbally.  Paul D. Schultz, The Future is Here: 
Technology in Police Departments, LXXV THE POLICE CHIEF 6 (June 2008), available at 
http://www.policechiefmagazine.org/magazine/index.cfm?article_id=1527&fuseaction=display&iss
ue_id=62008.   
 156.  Most local law enforcement officers have on-board computer access or smartphone/tablet 
access to a LEADS (Law Enforcement Agencies Data System) database that consolidates 
information on crimes and criminal suspects across the state’s law enforcement agencies.   
 157.  CLEAR stands for Citizen Law Enforcement Analysis and Reporting.  By 2007, the 
CLEAR database was used by 411 police departments in Illinois, Indiana and Wisconsin.  It 
contains millions of incident reports and other information that officers can query using wireless, 
touchscreen notebooks in their cars.  The data allows officers to instantly check suspects against the 
database of fugitives, parolees, and offenders who are wanted on warrants.  Citizen Law 
Enforcement Analysis and Reporting (CLEAR), HARVARDKENNEDYSCHOOL (2012), 
http://www.innovations.harvard.edu/awards.html?id=85381.   
 158.  Maria Fernando Parra-Chico, An Up-Close Perspective: The Enforcement of Federal 
Immigration Laws by State and Local Police, 7 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 321, 328 (2008).   
 159.  Rachel Zoghlin, Insecure Communities: How Increased Localization of Immigrant 
Enforcement Under President Obama Through the Secure Communities Program Makes us Less 
Safe, and May Violate the Constitution, 6 MOD. AM. 20, 21 (2010).   
 160.  National Crime Information Center, supra note 154.   
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violation of a protection order, or recover stolen property.  Albert 
Florence urged the New Jersey State Trooper who stopped his car, as 
well as the Burlington County Jail officials, to do exactly what the FBI 
recommends.  He urged them to verify the accuracy of their records with 
the Essex County Police Department, the agency to whom he paid the 
fine.  It was their refusal to follow the FBI’s suggestion that lead to 
Florence’s arrest, booking, and strip search humiliation. 
A study of local police enforcement of federal immigration law 
demonstrates the danger of overreliance on information from a computer 
database.  In 2005, researchers found that forty-two percent of all NCIC 
immigration hits in response to a police query were “false positives.”161  
Yet once the data is in the database, responsibility for inaccuracies is 
diffuse.  Police officers are not required to independently investigate the 
validity of a facially valid arrest warrant, even when the arrestee informs 
the officer that the warrant is erroneous.162  This is so even if the arrest is 
made pursuant to a bench warrant that was invalid at the time of 
arrest.163  The state trooper who disregarded Florence’s entreaties, and 
reasonably relied upon the information contained in the New Jersey law 
enforcement database, is considered not to have violated the Due 
Process Clause or the Fourth Amendment, and, as such, is entitled to 
qualified immunity in any civil rights action Florence might bring for 
false arrest.164  And we are all too familiar with the scenario in which 
unsuspecting travelers are routinely flagged at airports because their 
names match or resemble one on the federal terrorist watch list.  The 
number of names on the Terrorist Watchlist has grown steeply in the 
past decade, compounding the problem of inaccuracies.  Whereas 
288,000 names were on the list in 2005, the number had grown to 1.1 
 
 161.  HANNAH GLADSTEIN ET AL, MIGRATION POLICY INST., BLURRING THE LINES: A PROFILE 
OF STATE AND LOCAL POLICE ENFORCEMENT OF IMMIGRATION LAW USING THE NATIONAL CRIME 
INFORMATION CENTER DATABASE 12 (2005).   
 162.  Mann v. Hamilton, No. 90-3377, 1991 WL 87586, at *2 (N.J. Dist. Ct. May 20, 1991) 
(holding that a police officer who executes a facially valid arrest warrant does not have a “duty 
under the fourth amendment to investigate the validity of the warrant upon a protest by the arrestee 
that the warrant is invalid.”).   
 163.  Mitchell v. Aulis, 872 F.2d 577, 579 (4th Cir. 1989) (granting summary judgment for 
deputy sheriffs on civil rights claim where they made arrest pursuant to bench warrant that had been 
recalled, even though plaintiff informed them of status).   
 164.  Capone v. Marinelli, 868 F.2d 102, 105-06 (3d Cir. 1989) (holding police officer who 
reasonably relied upon facially valid written bulletin indicating warrant for arrest existed was 
entitled to qualified immunity in civil rights action for unlawful arrest).  The court must determine, 
as a matter of law, whether a defendant’s “belief that a warrant or probable cause existed was 
reasonable.”  Sharrar v. Felsing, 128 F.3d 810, 828 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing Rogers v. Powell, 120 
F.3d 446, 455-57 (3d Cir. 1997)).  To make this determination, the court must examine the 
information possessed by the defendants when they relied on the warrant.  Rogers, 120 F.3d at 455.   
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million by 2009.165  A Justice Department audit of the watch list in 2009 
revealed a thirty-five percent rate of error, and disclosed that in seventy-
two percent of the cases, the FBI failed to respond to these errors by 
removing the person from the watch list in a timely manner.166 
B.  Strip Searches: The “Auction Block” of the New Jim Crow 
The spectrum of risks and dangers Albert Florence’s custodial 
arrest raises for at least three of the nine justices, and the priority those 
potential harms are accorded in the parsing of individual rights and 
institutional interests, represent one view of the facts.  Another equally 
compelling view would shift the scales in another direction.  This other 
compelling tale is one familiar to African Americans who have 
experienced traffic stops, and faced the specter of detention—either brief 
or prolonged—and abuse of power based upon criminal suspicion.  It is 
also a view of the facts that incites fear, but not of the arrestee.  Instead 
the fear is of unchecked discretionary police power.  It is a tale of racial 
double standards, procedural exceptionalism, and sexual humiliation at 
the hands of state—and often white—authority figures. 
Albert Florence was a black man who owned, and drove, one of the 
ultimate status symbols of the day—the coveted BMW X5 sport utility 
vehicle.  The car was stopped by a state trooper patrolling outside the 
boundaries of urban New Jersey, in suburban Burlington County.  
Florence’s past experiences with “Driving While Black” made him wary 
enough of traffic stops by police to store in his car a copy of the court 
document certifying that the unsatisfied judgment (fine) upon which the 
bench warrant was issued had been satisfied.167  The state trooper who 
stopped Florence’s vehicle ignored his documentation and protestations 
that the outstanding warrant for his arrest was erroneous.  The trooper 
used his discretion in the field to apprehend and arrest Florence.  Once 
taken into custody, Florence was subjected to a strip search at the 
Burlington County Jail in violation of both New Jersey law and the jail’s 
own policy against strip searching persons arrested for minor offenses in 
 
 165.  Ruxandra Guidi, Growing Terror Watch List Flags People in Error, KPBS (May 31, 
2011), http://www.kpbs.org/news/2011/may/31/terror-watch-lists-grow-reasons-many-it-remain-
mys/; Press Release, ACLU, FBI Inspector General Reports 35 Percent Error Rate on Terror Watch 
List (May 6, 2009), available at http://www.aclu.org/technology-and-liberty/fbi-inspector-general-
reports-35-percent-error-rate-terror-watchlist.   
 166.  Audit Says FBI’s Watchlist Riddled With Errors, CHARITY & SEC. NETWORK (June 8, 
2009), http://www.charityandsecurity.org/news/FBI_Watchlist_Riddled_Errors.   
 167.  Petitioner kept with him a copy of the official document certifying that fact because in his 
view he had been previously been detained as an African American who drove nice cars and he 
wanted to avoid being wrongly arrested.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 1, at 3.   
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the absence of reasonable suspicion.168  This procedural irregularity 
caused Florence to be visually inspected by a jail official at close range 
while standing naked and being directed to open his mouth and lift his 
tongue, lift his arms, rotate, and lift his genitals.  Florence was then 
made to shower in the officer’s sight.169 
Next, Florence was denied a prompt probable cause determination 
before a magistrate that is required under both the Fourth Amendment 
and by New Jersey state law.  Indeed, for arrests with a warrant, New 
Jersey law requires that the arrestee be brought before a judge for a bail 
hearing “no later than 12 hours after arrest.”170  Despite repeated 
requests by Florence, his wife, and his attorney, jail officials in 
Burlington County denied Florence an appearance before a judge for six 
days.171  Had he been granted a prompt bail hearing, the fact that the 
database was in error would have come to the judge’s attention and 
Florence would have been released immediately.  Instead, the denial of a 
prompt hearing caused Florence to languish in jail, deprived of a shower, 
a toothbrush, toothpaste, and soap for six days. 
On the sixth day, Florence was transported in a jail uniform and 
handcuffs to Essex County, where he was once again subjected to a strip 
search.  The second strip search was more intrusive than the first.  Upon 
being booked into the Essex County Correctional Facility, Florence was 
ordered to strip naked in a shower area in the presence of several others 
and shower.  Under close supervision of the officers and in the plain 
sight of each other and employees entering the room, the prisoners were 
collectively ordered to open their mouths, lift their genitals, turn around, 
squat, and cough.  Florence was held overnight at the Essex County 
 
 168.  N.J. STAT. ANN. §2A:161A-1 (West 2012) (providing that an individual arrested for a 
“non-indictable” offense, a minor offense in the vernacular of New Jersey state law, “shall not be 
subjected to a strip search” absent a search warrant, consent, or reasonable suspicion that he may 
possess contraband); Burlington County Search of Inmates Procedure § 1186 (prohibiting strip 
searches “unless there is a reasonable suspicion that a weapon, controlled dangerous substance or 
contraband will be found”), Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 1, at 3-4.  Burlington County 
distinguishes “visual observation” from “strip searches” on the basis that the former is only 
conducted to uncover identifying marks or wounds, whereas the latter is conducted “systematically” 
for the purpose of intercepting contraband.  The distinction is specious.  Even Justice Kennedy 
conceded that the use of the term strip search is imprecise.  He goes on to treat the searches Albert 
Florence was subjected to as strip searches.   
 169.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 1, at 5.  The officials at the jail knew that 
Florence had been arrested for the non-indictable offense of “civil contempt,” would have been 
aware of the circumstances in which petitioner was arrested (leaving a traffic stop) and whether he 
had a history of carrying contraband, and would have checked his criminal history to assess whether 
there was “reasonable suspicion” to strip search him.   
 170.  N.J.R.Ct. 3:4-1(b) (West 2012).   
 171.  Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 57 (1991); N.J.R.Ct. 3:4-1(b), 2(a) (West 2012).   
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Correctional Facility before being transported to the Essex County 
Courthouse to finally appear before a judge, who emphatically ordered 
him released on the basis that no ground for arresting him existed. 
It is not lost on the average African American in the United States 
that current strip searches are remarkably similar to the way slaves were 
treated on the auction block.172  Recent scholarship on slave markets 
points out that this sort of “reading of bodies,” as it is described in the 
literature, is a form of race-making in both the context of the strip search 
and the operation of the auction block.  Despite the obvious differences 
in inspecting black bodies for the purposes of private sale rather than 
governmental detention, the lived experience of the strip search in the 
slave market and in the jail is hauntingly similar.  The goals of the 
searches are quite similar.  As Walter Johnson makes clear in his 
analysis and captivating description of the slave markets in the 
Antebellum South, slaves were physically inspected, sorted, and 
classified by potential buyers for the purpose of eliminating risk in the 
slave buying transaction.173  The risk slave buyers and their agents 
sought to eliminate was the danger of a deception by the slave 
merchant—obscuring with garments and padding illness, infirmity, and 
the unsuitableness of a slave to work.174  Thus strip searches were 
conducted to facilitate the “reading” of slaves’ bodies, to reveal hidden 
insights about them in the absence of reliable information about their 
origins.175  To that end, buyers would engage in practices ranging from 
closely visually inspecting the naked bodies of slaves to inserting their 
thumbs into the mouths of slaves in order to examine their gums and 
teeth, including running their hands over slaves’ bodies, fingering their 
joints, and kneading their flesh.176 
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion defends the authority of jail 
officials to perform strip searches on detainees, in the absence of a 
reasonable suspicion that they possess contraband, as a standard part of 
the intake process.  Kennedy’s defense of the practice of strip-searching 
detainees is premised on the interest of jailers in reducing the risk that 
 
    172.   This view of police treatment of African Americans can be criticized for failing to take 
into account the socio-economic class dynamics of police encounters with African American men 
who drive high-status cars.  The notion that not only race is made, but class status is contested, in 
these encounters can be discerned as a subjugation of black men who don’t “know their place.”  It is 
a class critique I intend to explore in the future scholarship.    
 173.  See WALTER JOHNSON, SOUL BY SOUL: LIFE IN AN ANTEBELLUM SLAVE MARKET 
(1999).   
 174.  Id. at 137-61.  
 175.  Id. 
 176.  Id. at 141. 
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detainees present to the facility and its occupants due to uncertainties 
about their health, injuries, gang affiliations, and propensity for violence.  
This mirrors exactly the premises of the slave merchants in the slave 
pens. 
C.  Taking a Dim View of Bright Lines 
Judicial infatuation with “bright line” rules has been very 
pronounced in the evolution of Fourth Amendment doctrine over the 
past forty years of the War on Drugs.  To enable police officers to more 
readily detect and intercept a voluminous and ever-changing drug trade, 
federal courts adopted “bright line” rules, in which courts deferred to the 
discretionary judgments of law enforcement officers in the field and 
limited the application of legal standards that would allow courts to 
evaluate the circumstances after the fact, and perhaps reach a different 
conclusion.  Until recently, federal judges progressively expanded the 
latitude of law enforcement officers to treat arrestees categorically in the 
doctrine of searches incident to lawful arrest for automobile occupants.  
However, as law enforcement agencies developed policies based upon 
these “one size fits all” rules and adopted practices that strained judicial 
standards and “untether[ed] the rule from [its] justifications,”177 the 
Supreme Court has reinterpreted the Fourth Amendment in a manner 
that reconnected the rule to its rationale. 
Specifically, in the context of searches incident to the lawful arrest 
of automobile occupants, the Supreme Court retreated from the 
application of a categorical rule.  The Supreme Court carved out an 
exception to the rule that warrantless searches are per se unreasonable in 
Chimel v. California.  The Court decided that contemporaneous to a 
lawful arrest, police could search without a warrant “the area from 
within which [an arrestee] might gain possession of a weapon or 
destructible evidence,” or the arrestee’s “wingspan.”178  When the 
Supreme Court expanded the “search incident to a lawful arrest” 
exception to cover police stops and arrests of automobile occupants in 
New York v. Belton, a drug interdiction case, they interpreted the 
“wingspan” of an arrestee to categorically include the entire passenger 
compartment of the automobile.  This “bright line” rule was based upon 
the assumption that articles inside a vehicle’s passenger compartment 
are “generally . . . within ‘the area into which an arrestee might 
 
 177.  Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 343 (2009).   
 178.  395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969).   
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reach.’”179 
Law enforcement agencies then read the “bright line” rule of Belton 
to authorize a host of automobile searches in circumstances increasingly 
more remote to the justification upon which the rule was based.  
Examples include United States v. Hrasky,180 United States v. Weaver,181 
and United States v. White.182  In each of these instances, the search was 
justified on the basis of the exception created by Belton, but the search 
was unhinged from the original rationale.  That disconnection created 
space for abuses of the warrantless search by law enforcement officers. 
A case that clearly demonstrates this abuse is Thornton v. United 
States.183  In 2001, a police officer patrolling the streets of Norfolk, 
Virginia became suspicious of a driver, Marcus Thornton, whose car 
displayed license plates that were registered to another vehicle.184  
Before the officer could pull him over, he drove into a parking lot, 
parked, and got out of the vehicle.185  When questioned by the officer, 
Thornton replied that he had no weapons or narcotics on him, but when 
he consented to a pat frisk, bags of marijuana and crack cocaine were 
found on his person.186  After the officer handcuffed Thornton, arrested 
him, and placed him in the back seat of his patrol car, he searched the 
vehicle and found a 9-millimeter handgun under the driver’s seat.187 
In spite of the impossibility of Thornton reaching the passenger 
compartment of the vehicle, as he was handcuffed in the back of a patrol 
car, the Supreme Court upheld the warrantless search of the car, largely 
on the basis of the “bright line” rule that construed the entire passenger 
compartment of a vehicle as “accessible” to an arrestee without regard to 
actual improbability.188  Indeed, Justice O’Connor criticized the holding 
in her concurring opinion when she observed that: “[L]ower court 
decisions seem now to treat the ability to search a vehicle incident to the 
arrest of a recent occupant as a police entitlement rather than as an 
 
 179.  New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981).   
 180.  453 F.3d 1099, 1102 (8th Cir. 2006) (upholding a search conducted an hour after the 
arrestee was apprehended and after he had been handcuffed and placed in the back of a patrol car).   
 181.  433 F.3d 1104, 1106 (9th Cir. 2006) (upholding a search conducted ten to fifteen minutes 
after an arrest and after the arrestee had been handcuffed and secured in the back of a patrol car).   
 182.  871 F.2d 41, 44 (6th Cir. 1989) (upholding a search conducted after the arrestee had been 
handcuffed and secured in the back of a police cruiser).   
 183.  541 U.S. 615 (2004).   
 184.  Id. at 618.   
 185.  Id.   
 186.  Id.  
 187.  Id. 
 188.  Id. at 622-23.   
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exception justified by the . . .  rationale[ ] of Chimel.”189 
In 2009, the Supreme Court, in Arizona v. Gant, rejected the 
extreme application of Belton’s “bright line” rule and returned the 
doctrine to the rationale that initially justified the creation of the warrant 
exception.190  On facts similar to Thornton, Rodney Gant was arrested 
for driving with a suspended license, handcuffed, and locked in the back 
of a patrol car.191  While immobilized in the back of the patrol car, Gant 
had his car searched by police officers, who discovered cocaine in the 
pocket of a jacket on the backseat.192  The Arizona Supreme Court held 
that the search-incident-to-arrest of an automobile occupant exception to 
the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement did not justify the 
search.193  The State’s position was that Belton searches were reasonable 
regardless of the possibility of access in a given case because an 
expansive rule correctly balanced law enforcement interests, including 
the interest in a bright-line rule, with an arrestee’s limited privacy 
interest in his vehicle.194  In other words, the bright line rule served the 
interests of law enforcement officers and took priority over the arrestee’s 
privacy.  In emphatically rejecting this reasoning, Justice Stevens 
criticized the State for undervaluing the privacy interest of the arrestee 
and exaggerating the clarity the bright line rule provides.195 
D.  Fear-Mongering and the Danger Orgy 
Justice Kennedy’s argument in Florence v. Board of Chosen 
Freeholders of County of Burlington is essentially that the risks to jail 
officials, other detainees, and the public are too great not to apply a 
categorical rule requiring the visual inspection at close range while 
naked of all arrestees coming into jail facilities.  He cites a vast array of 
empirical sources to establish the gravity of risk stemming from the 
introduction of lice or contagious infection, the increasing number of 
gang members going through the intake process, concealment of 
weapons and contraband, and dominant inmates coercing weak arrestees 
to smuggle contraband into jails.196 
 
 189.  Id. at 624 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part) (emphasis added).   
 190.  556 U.S. 332 (2009).   
 191.  Id. at 335.   
 192.  Id.   
 193.  Id.   
 194.  Id. at 343.   
 195.  Id. at 344-45.   
 196.  Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S.Ct. 1510, 1518 (2012).  Justice Kennedy 
never considers the culpability of staff who bring contraband into jails.  Nor does he discuss visitors 
as a source of contraband.  Not only are these well-known vectors of contraband, Petition for Writ 
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This part of Kennedy’s opinion can at best be described as a 
“danger orgy.”  In the context of Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Florence, 
fear and danger are far more salient than the empirical data on 
contraband in jails that suggests strip searches uniformly conducted on 
all detainees are unlikely to be dramatically more effective than non-
uniform strip searches. 
In regard to this danger orgy, Kennedy makes two important 
assertions.  First, jails are fraught with danger, even from the most 
innocuous source, and therefore staff and detainees are constantly at risk 
of harm from any new detainee who is not thoroughly searched.197  For 
example, Justice Kennedy argues that minor offenders can be among the 
most dangerous, citing Timothy McVeigh as an example.198  McVeigh 
was stopped by a state trooper for driving without a license plate, only 
hours after the Oklahoma City bombing.199  Second, the less dangerous 
arrestees appear to be, the more vigilant jail officials must be, and 
therefore only a categorical rule with no exceptions is sufficient to 
address the danger.200  In support of this assertion, Kennedy describes 
how a person arrested on a minor offense may be targeted by a 
“hardened criminal” or gang member and coerced into smuggling 
contraband into the facility.201 
This kind of reasoning reflects two prominent features of 
lawmaking during the War on Drugs: fear-mongering and actuarial 
justice.202  Fear-mongering during the War on Drugs was a conscious 
 
of Certiorari, supra note 1, at 23, but there is even recent evidence of guards smuggling contraband 
into one of the specific jails in this case.  Several years after Albert Florence was strip searched in 
the Essex County Correctional Facility, while the case was winding its way through the federal 
courts, two Essex County officers were arrested for playing a leading role in a smuggling ring that 
“hand-delivered drugs and cell phones” to detainees.  See James Queally & Amy Ellis Nutt, Essex 
jail inmates were hand-delivered drugs, cell phones in smuggling scheme, THE STAR-LEDGER (July 
31, 2010, 7:54 AM), http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2010/07/guards_hand-
delivered_drugs_ce.html.  Abuse of power of this nature is facilitated by the extreme deference jail 
officials are afforded in searches by the Florence case.   
 197.  Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1518.   
 198.  Id. at 1520.   
 199.  Id.  (Reportedly, McVeigh was stopped by a state trooper for a driving without a license 
plate only hours after he bombed the federal building in Oklahoma City).   
 200.  Id. at 1520-21.   
 201.  “Even if people arrested for a minor offense do not themselves wish to introduce 
contraband into a jail, them may be coerced into doing so by others.”  Id. at 1521.   
 202.  See FRANKLIN E ZIMRING ET AL, PUNISHMENT AND DEMOCRACY: THREE STRIKES AND 
YOU’RE OUT IN CALIFORNIA (2001); KATHERINE A. BECKETT & THEODORE SASSON, THE POLITICS 
OF INJUSTICE: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA (Sage Publ’ns, ed. 2000); KATHERINE 
BECKETT, MAKING CRIME PAY: LAW AND ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN POLITICS (1997); 
STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF STREET CRIME CRIMINAL PROCESS AND CULTURAL 
OBSESSION (1992); STUART A. SCHEINGOLD & MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE POLITICS OF LAW AND 
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strategy by politicians on both sides of the aisle, corporations, and the 
media to exploit the anxieties of the middle-class in order to achieve 
numerous objectives including winning elections, selling real estate in 
gated communities,203 selling sport utility vehicles to city dwellers, and 
distracting attention from state failures.204  Who can forget George H.W. 
Bush’s relentless attack on Democratic presidential candidate Michael 
Dukakis over an assault-rape committed by the convicted murderer 
Willie Horton while on a Massachusetts weekend prison furlough?  
Justice Kennedy discusses Timothy McVeigh to make a point about 
danger, and to justify the fear that any single person arrested in a traffic 
stop can be a dangerous criminal.  He then uses that fear—the specter of 
bringing a domestic terrorist into a jail—to justify searching any and all 
arrestees upon admission into a jail, regardless of the reason for their 
arrest. 
Justice Kennedy’s syllogism disregards the fact that McVeigh may 
well have been dangerous, stopped by police for a minor traffic offense, 
and yet present a low risk as a person being admitted into the general 
population of a jail.  As the dissenting justices point out, the likelihood 
that someone apprehended by police officers on the street would be 
equipped with contraband ready to be introduced into a jail facility is 
quite low.205  McVeigh may well have been both a domestic terrorist, 
and a low-risk admit, however, Justice Kennedy fails to acknowledge 
that McVeigh is not typical of the vast majority of arrestees.  And yet 
Kennedy focuses on McVeigh.  The very mention of his name is 
calculated to elicit knee-jerk anxiety, rather than a rational weighing of 
the risks against the arrestee’s interest in privacy. 
It has long been known among corrections staff and researchers that 
people often behave differently inside prisons than they do in outside 
settings and that an offenders’ current crime of conviction, criminal 
history, or outstanding retainers cannot be the sole guide to how they 
will adjust to imprisonment.  Since the 1970s, research on inmate 
classification and inmate prison adaption has shown that numerous other 
factors (such as mental illness, drug abuse, personality, and previous 
imprisonment) need to be weighed to determine the potential threat to 
 
ORDER: STREET CRIME AND PUBLIC POLICY (Quid Pro, LLC, ed. 2011); MICHAEL W. FLAMM, LAW 
AND ORDER: STREET CRIME, CIVIL UNREST, AND THE CRISIS OF LIBERALISM IN THE 1960S (2005); 
STUART HALL ET AL, POLICING THE CRISIS: MUGGING, THE STATE AND LAW AND ORDER (1978).   
 203.  See MIKE DAVIS, CITY OF QUARTZ: EXCAVATING THE FUTURE IN LOS ANGELES (1992).   
 204.  See DAVID GARLAND, CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN 
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY (2001); David Garland, Limits of the Sovereign State, 36 BRIT. J. 
CRIMINOLOGY 445 (1996).   
 205.  Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1528-29.   
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institutional security posed by any particular inmate.  Inmate 
classification systems often distinguish between public security threats 
and institutional security threats.  Offenders who commit horrific crimes 
may in fact present little threat to prison order.  The nature of the crime 
committed might even make such inmates especially vulnerable in 
prison.206 
Justice Kennedy’s reasoning about the difficulty of assessing the 
dangerousness of minor offenders also resonates with a model of 
correctional administration that became much more prominent during 
the 1980s.  Referred to variously as “actuarial justice” or the “new 
penology,” this model prioritizes the concept of risk and incapacitation 
over other penal rationales, like rehabilitation or retribution.207  It seeks 
 
 206.  For a general sampling of this literature see, DON A. ANDREWS & JAMES BONTA, 
PSYCHOLOGY OF CRIMINAL CONDUCT (5th ed. 2010); Don A. Andrews et al, The Recent Past and 
Near Future of Risk and/or Need Assessment, 52 CRIME & DELINQ. 7 (2006); James Austin, 
Assessing the New Generation of Prison Classification Models, 29 CRIME & DELINQ. 561 (1983); 
Special Issue: Prison Classification Systems, 32 CRIME & DELINQ. 251 (1986); Carl B. Clements, 
The Future of Offender Classification: Some Cautions and Prospects, 8 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 15 
(1981); Carl B. Clements, Offender Classification: Two Decades of Progress, 23 CRIM. JUST. & 
BEHAV. 121 (1996); PREDICTION AND CLASSIFICATION: CRIMINAL JUSTICE DECISION-MAKING 
(Don M. Gottredson & Michael Tonry eds.,1988); PATRICIA L. HARDYMAN ET AL, INTERNAL 
PRISON CLASSIFICATION SYSTEMS: CASE STUDIES IN THEIR DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION 
(General Books ed. 2011); Philip W. Harris, The Interpersonality Maturity Level Classification 
System: I-Level, 15 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 58 (1988); Carl Jesness, The Jesness Inventory 
Classification System, 15 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 78 (1988); HERBERT QUAY, MANAGING ADULT 
INMATES: CLASSIFICATION FOR HOUSING AND PROGRAM ASSIGNMENTS (1984); HANS TOCH, 
LIVING IN PRISON (Free Press ed. 1977); HANS TOCH, THE MOSAIC OF DESPAIR: HUMAN 
BREAKDOWNS IN PRISON (1992); PATRICIA VAN VOORHIS, PSYCHOLOGICAL CLASSIFICATION OF 
THE ADULT MALE PRISON INMATE (1994).  For a discussion of the political contest and 
transnational diffusion of the classification reforms of the 1970s and 1980s, see Joshua R. Coene, 
“Putting the Value Back in Punishment”: Transforming Prisons and Politics in New South Wales 
and Pennsylvania, 1970-1995 (unpublished PhD diss., Univ. of Mich., 2013 expected) (on file with 
author).   
 207.  The literature on risk in criminal law and penology is extensive.  For influential works 
discussing how risk relates to recent changes in penal policy and practice, see Theodore Caplow & 
Jonathan Simon, Understanding Prison Policy and Population Trends, 26 CRIME & JUST. 63 
(Prisons) (1999); IMAGINARY PENALTIES (Pat Carlen ed., 2008); STANLEY COHEN, VISIONS OF 
SOCIAL CONTROL: CRIME, PUNISHMENT, AND CLASSIFICATION (1985); Leonidas K. Cheliotis, How 
Iron is the Iron Cage of New Penology?: The Role of Human Agency in the Implementation of 
Criminal Justice Policy, 8 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 313 (2006); Malcolm Feeley & Jonathan Simon, 
The New Penology: Notes on the Emerging Strategy of Corrections and Its Implications, 30 
CRIMINOLOGY 449 (1992); Malcolm Feeley & Jonathan Simon, Actuarial Justice: The Emerging 
New Criminal Law, in THE FUTURES OF CRIMINOLOGY (David Nelken ed. 1994); GARLAND, 
THE CULTURE OF CONTROL, supra note 204; Garland, The Limits of the Sovereign State, supra note 
204; Daniel Glaser, Who Gets Probation and Parole: Case Study Versus Actuarial Decision 
Making, In CRIME AND THE RISK SOCIETY (Pat O’Malley ed. 1998); KELLY HANNAH-MOFFAT, 
PUNISHMENT IN DISGUISE: PENAL GOVERNANCE AND CANADIA WOMEN’S IMPRISONMENT (2001); 
Kelly Hannah-Moffat, Moral Agent or Actuarial Subject: Risk and Canadian Women’s 
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to identify high-risk offenders and situations and deploy techniques for 
managing or neutralizing them rather than transforming or reforming 
them.  In this sense, it resembles the actuarial practices that are 
commonplace in the insurance industry.  Like determining the riskiness 
of certain people and activities for setting premiums, jail officials see 
detainees less as individuals with specific biographic histories in this 
model and more as assortments of various risks.  This way of viewing 
inmates would, of course, depend on other factors such as the situation at 
hand.  Moreover, other rationales still inform many aspects of 
incarceration and how inmates are viewed and treated.  Risk 
management practices tend to adhere more frequently at certain decision 
points, like in boards determining discretionary release and parole, or in 
settings that contain a large degree of uncertainty or potential for 
disruption.  The intake unit of a detention center or county jail, where 
little information would be known about the detainees being brought into 
the facility, is just such a setting. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Florence is remarkable in that its holding departs from recent 
Fourth Amendment decisions rejecting categorical approaches to 
arrestees and bright line rules.  It is also unique in its abandonment of 
the “reasonable suspicion” standard for strip searches adopted by the 
majority of the Circuit Courts of Appeal.  Moreover, Florence is striking 
in its dismissal of the best practices urged by some of the most 
influential corrections associations in the country. 
 
Imprisonment, 3 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 71(1999); GENDERED RISKS (Kelly Hannah-Moffat 
& Pat O’Malley eds., 2006); BERNARD E. HARCOURT, AGAINST PREDICTION: PUNISHING AND 
POLICING IN AN ACTURIAL AGE (2006); BERNARD E. HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF ORDER: THE FALSE 
PROMISE OF BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING (2d ed. 2005); PAT O’MALLEY, CRIME AND RISK (2010); 
Kimberly Kempf-Leonard & Elicka S.L. Peterson, Expanding Realms of the New Penology: The 
Advent of Actuarial Justice for Juveniles, 2 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 66 (2000); Pat O’Malley, The 
Uncertain Promise of Risk. 37 AUSTL. & N.Z. J. CRIMINOLOGY 323 (2004); Pat O’Malley, Volatile 
and Contradictory Punishment, 3 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 175 (1999); Pat O’Malley, Risk, 
Power and Crime Prevention, 21 ECON. & SOC’Y 252 (1992); JOHN PRATT, GOVERNING THE 
DANGEROUS (1998); Nancy Reichman, Managing Crime Risks: Toward an Insurance Based Model 
of Social Control, in 8 RESEARCH IN LAW, DEVIANCE AND SOCIAL CONTROL (Stephen Spitzer & 
Andrew Scull eds., 8th vol. 1988); JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE 
WAR ON CRIME TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR (2d 
ed. 2009); Jonathan Simon, The Emergence of a Risk Society: Insurance, Law and the State, 95 
SOCIALIST REV. 61 (1987); Jonathan Simon, The Ideological Effect of Actuarial Practices, 22 LAW 
& SOC’Y REV. 771 (1988); MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT: RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT 
IN AMERICA (1995); LOÏC WACQUANT, PRISONS OF POVERTY (2009); LOÏC WACQUANT, PUNISHING 
THE POOR: THE NEOLIBERAL GOVERNMENT OF SOCIAL INSECURITY (2009).   
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In Part I of this article, we have reviewed the history of search and 
seizure law, especially in its more recent formulation by the Court since 
the 1960s and how it was subsequently affected by the War on Drugs.  
Part II is a description of Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in the 
Florence case and the concurring and dissenting opinions.  Part III is a 
discussion of the four major cases relied upon by the Florence Court: 
Bell v. Wolfish, Hudson v. Palmer, Turner v. Safley, and Atwater v. Lago 
Vista.  Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy read these cases 
selectively to support a bright line rule, failing to consider how these 
four precedents differed significantly from the situation of Albert 
Florence.  Part IV presents four major points of analysis.  Law 
enforcement relied too heavily on inaccurate information about Albert 
Florence contained in a database.  Second, strip searches are largely 
unnecessary and degrade those subjected to them in the majority of 
cases.  Indeed, strip searches echo previous rituals of coercive 
discriminatory practices associated with slave markets.  Third, the 
constitutional guides provided by Florence put far too much 
discretionary power in the hands of law enforcement and invite abuse of 
authority.  Fourth, the Florence decision mobilizes fear through repeated 
references to extreme dangerousness and risk in the nature of jail and 
invokes super villains like Timothy McVeigh.  This is a poor decision 
and poor precedent that will need to be overcome instead of followed. 
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